

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 DOHA 01274 301029Z

20

ACTION NEA-07

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 INR-05 PM-03 DODE-00 ACDA-10 SP-02

PRS-01 L-01 CIAE-00 IO-03 EUR-08 /055 W

----- 046042

R 300950Z NOV 76

FM AMEMBASSY DOHA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2036

INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

USINT BAGHDAD

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY MANAMA

AMEMBASSY MUSCAT

AMEMBASSY SANA

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

COMIDEASTFOR

CINCUSNAVEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L DOHA 1274

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR MPOL MASS OCLR QA US

SUBJ: COMIDEASTFOR VISIT TO QATAR

1. COMIDEASTFOR RADM WILLIAM J. CROWE MADE INFORMAL VISIT TO QATAR NOV 29-30. GOQ PRESCRIBED GUIDELINES FOR VISIT WERE THAT IT BE CONSIDERED "PRIVATE" AND THAT ONLY OFFICIAL ACTIVITY BE OFFICE CALL BY ADM CROWE, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR, ON QATARI ARMED FORCES COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF SHAYKH HAMAD BIN KHALIFA AL THANI.

2. DURING NOV 29 OFFICE CALL, DISCUSSION TOUCHED ON NUMBER OF SUBJECTS, INCLUDING:

(A) GULF SECURITY AND GULF FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCE IN MUSCAT: SHAYKH HAMAD CONFIRMED LACK OF CONCRETE RESULTS AT MUSCAT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 DOHA 01274 301029Z

CONFERENCE. HE INDICATED THAT ANY PROGRESS ON DISCUSSION ON GULF

SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS HAD FOUNDERED ON OMANI AND IRANIAN INSISTENCE ON THEIR JOINT CONTROL OF THE HORMUZ STRAITS. ACCORDING HAMAD, SAUDIS AND SMALLER ARAB GULF STATES, AS WELL AS IRAQ FOR DIFFERENT REASONS, WERE NOT ABOUT TO PUT HORMUZ STRAITS EXCLUSIVELY IN OMANI/IRANIAN HANDS.

(B) MIDEASTFOR CONTINUANCE IN BAHRAIN: ADMIRAL CROWE BROUGHT SHAYKH HAMAD UP TO DATE ON US TALKS WITH GOB ON CONTINUANCE OF US MIDEASTFOR IN BAHRAIN. WE ASKED FOR HAMAD'S VIEWS. HE REPLIED THAT THIS WAS A DECISION FOR GOB TO MAKE, AND MADE SOME VAGUE REFERENCE TO DISPUTES WITHIN RULING FAMILY IN BAHRAIN AND LEFTIST OPPOSITION AS BEING REASONS FOR BAHRAIN'S DESIRE TO SEE MIDEASTFOR LEAVE. ASKED ABOUT GOQ ATTITUDE, HE FIRST SAID THAT MIDEASTFOR PRESENCE IN BAHRAIN WAS NO RPT NO PROBLEM FOR QATARIS, BUT QUICKLY REVERTED TO STANDARD GOQ LINE ON SUBJECT THAT IF US SUCCESSFULLY CATALYZED MID EAST SETTLEMENT AGREEABLE TO ARABS, MIDEASTFOR PROBLEM AND ALL OTHER PROBLEMS IN US-ARAB RELATIONS WOULD BE EASILY SETTLED. DURING COURSE OF CONVERSATION ON SUBJECT, HE REPEATED OFTEN-EXPRESSED VIEW THAT MIDEASTFOR PRESENCE DREW SOVIET COUNTER PRESENCE INTO GULF AND, THEREFORE, THERE IS RATIONALE FOR HAVING NO GREAT POWER PRESENCE IN REGION.

(C) PDRY AND IRAQ: HAMAD EXPRESSED NO RPT NO CONFIDENCE THAT ARAB EFFORTS TO WEAN ADEN REGIME AWAY FROM SOVIETS AND OTHER COMMUNIST POWER PRESENCE WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL. RE IRAQ, HE NOTED SOVIET PRESENCE THERE, BUT INDICATED IRAQIS UNTRUSTWORTHINESS MORE A FUNCTION OF THEIR OWN UNPREDICTABILITY THAN OF SOVIET PRESENCE.

(D) LEBANON: HAMAD MADE INTRIGUING STATEMENT THAT CONSERVATIVE ARAB REGIMES HAD BEEN MOST PLEASED BY LEBANESE CIVIL WAR, SINCE IT HAD SERVED THEIR PURPOSES IN IMAGING RADICAL ELEMENTS AND RADICAL PRESS BASED IN LEBANON.

(E) POSSIBILITIES OF MIDEASTFOR TRAINING QATARI NAVAL PERSONNEL, ENGAGING IN JOINT EXERCISES, ETC: HAMAD SAID THAT GOQ WOULD BE PLEASED TO TAKE UP MIDEASTFOR OFFER OF TRAINING AND JOINT EXERCISES, BUT THIS NOT POSSIBLE UNTIL UNDERSTAFFED QATARI NAVY COMPLETES TRAINING OF NUMBER OF QATARIS NOW ABROAD IN UK AND PAKISTAN. HE MENTIONED SIX-MONTH TIMEFRAME AS THAT REQUIRED FOR CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 DOHA 01274 301029Z

QATARI NAVY TO BE ADEQUATELY STAFFED. WE REMINDED HIM THAT THIS WAS MUCH LONGER TIME THAN WE HAD DISCUSSED ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS, BUT IT WAS CLEAR THAT HE WAS NOT READY TO DO ANYTHING ON THIS IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

3. COMMENT: SHAYKH HAMAD'S VIEWS ON MANY SUBJECTS ARE VERY MUCH HIS OWN AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS INDICATIONS OF OFFICIAL GOQ ATTITUDES. WHEN THEY SEEM RATHER BIZARRE, IT IS THE RESULT

OF HIS GENERALLY VAGUE UNDERSTANDING OF SITUATIONS IN AREA AND
NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. RE TRAINING, WE ARE DISAPPOINTED WITH
CONTINUAL AND LENGTHENING DELAYS ON THIS, BUT WE HAVE NO ALTER-
NATIVE TO REMIND HIM PERIODICALLY OF OUR OFFER.
PAGANELLI

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MILITARY PERSONNEL, MILITARY VISITS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 30 NOV 1976
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: ellisoob
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976DOHA01274
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760443-0246
From: DOHA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t1976115/aaaaadup.tel
Line Count: 120
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION NEA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: ellisoob
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 30 OCT 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <30 OCT 2003 by GarlanWA>; APPROVED <13 OCT 2004 by ellisoob>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: COMIDEASTFOR VISIT TO QATAR
TAGS: PFOR, MPOL, MASS, OCLR, QA, US, (CROWE, WILLIAM J)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006